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Chapter 3
Working
As we saw in the previous chapter, the history of urbanization all around the world
is long and multifaceted. Thus far we have considered this history without paying
much attention to the internal dynamics of cities. In this chapter, we set out to
describe some of the production and employment features of cities. These features
are not only of critical importance in their own right, but also shape urban patterns
and urban growth trends as a whole. In turn, cities constitute major foundations of
the growth and prosperity of modern economies. The discussion that follows
focuses mainly, but not exclusively, on cities in the modern era.
3.1 Working and Living in the Urban Milieu
In their internal organization, cities appear at ﬁrst glance to be composed of a
bewildering and incomprehensible mass of heterogeneous objects and activities.
More careful scrutiny, however, reveals that there are some fairly systematic
organizing principles that can help to moderate this complexity and to bring it into
more understandable order. In particular, one way of clarifying at least some of the
puzzling diversity that characterizes the internal organization of the city is to
describe it in terms of three broad structural features comprising (a) production
space (areas where goods and services are created), (b) residential space (the parts
of the city where workers live and carry on much of their social life), and (c) cir-
culation space (where movement through the city occurs, and notably the daily
movement of workers between production space and residential space). The
interweaving of these three spaces delineates the spatial layout (spread) and internal
interactions (flows) of every city, though their speciﬁc shape and form vary widely
across the cities of the world. Frequently, these spaces interpenetrate and overlap
with one another in various ways, as, for example, when residential space is also
used for production.
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Of course, the city as a whole is always considerably more substantial than this
simple threefold schema suggests, and we would need to introduce many more
social, cultural, and political attributes in order to get a more complete sense of the
urban in its full complexity and vitality. But this schema is useful for our discussion
both here and in the next chapter because it points to some of the most basic
structural elements of the city. Thus, production space is where employment sites
are concentrated and where people earn a living; residential space is where urban
dwellers live, socialize, pursue family life, and raise children; and circulation space
provides channels of access between different urban activities, most especially
between home and work. One of the most obvious features of the modern city is the
daily cycle of urban life in which large numbers of individuals—perhaps the
majority of the adult urban population—leave their residences in the morning and
journey through the city in order to reach their places of employment or livelihood;
and then in the late afternoon and early evening proceed through a reverse set of
motions as they travel from work back to home. This picture is modiﬁed in cities
where many people live and seek livelihoods in the same parts of the city, whether
because work is informal or home-based or because accommodation is provided in
factory complexes. It is also worth bearing in mind that “home” involves consid-
erable domestic labour, usually disproportionately borne by women.
In any case, without work, whether formal or informal, and the productive
activities that support it, urbanization as we know it could not survive. Indeed, one
of the primary reasons for the existence of cities in the ﬁrst place is their function as
centres of economic life. By the same token, production and work activities are the
principal drivers of urban development, and the basic factors that induce the growth
(and decline) of cities.
3.2 From Craft Production to Capitalist Industrialization
Even before the historical transition to industrial capitalism in the 17th and 18th
centuries, the large city populations recorded in the previous chapter were engaged
in distinctive forms of urban life revolving around production and work, and above
all traditional small-scale craft activities focussed on outputs like textiles, ceramics,
furniture, and leather goods, whether for internal consumption or for trade. Some of
this trade involved exchange for agricultural products originating in surrounding
agricultural communities; some of it, usually the greater part, involved exports to
more distant locations in exchange for imports.
With the advent of capitalism and the rise of factory-based types of production,
new modes and patterns of urbanization began to make their historical and geo-
graphical appearance. The most advanced expression of this new order of things is
represented by Britain after the early 18th century when the Industrial Revolution
started its inexorable rise. As in earlier phases, external connections were crucial in
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the development of cities; in particular, Britain’s industrialization was intimately
associated with the import of commodities (i.e. industrial inputs such as cotton and
foodstuffs such as wheat) from various colonies and settler communities around the
world.
The factories and workshops that proliferated as early industrialization processes
in Britain ran their course were located above all in areas close to energy sources
such as waterpower and coalﬁelds. However, as the steam engine came to supplant
the water mill, coal rapidly became by far the dominant source of energy, especially
in the major manufacturing sectors of the 19th century such as textiles, metal goods,
and machinery. Clusters of factories and workshops comprised the functional nuclei
of the rising manufacturing towns. Immediately around them, extensive tracts of
working-class housing also came into being as people (often displaced agricultural
labourers from the surrounding countryside) moved into the towns in search of
employment.
For much of the period of classic industrialization, workers in the main British
manufacturing towns formed a downtrodden and impoverished proletariat, vividly
described by Engels in his book The Condition of the Working Class in England,
which portrays the horrors of working-class housing conditions in Manchester in
the middle of the 19th century. At this time, capitalist forms of industrialization and
urbanization were also developing rapidly in different parts of Continental Europe
and the United States, with resulting urban social problems much like those of
Britain. Early and at ﬁrst very tentative forms of town planning, such as street
cleaning, public health measures, and housing legislation, were introduced in
attempts to mitigate some of these problems. Also, as the 19th century wore on, the
sporadic passage of relatively progressive social legislation (including the ofﬁcial
authorization of trade unions) gradually, and in noticeably diverse ways in different
countries, brought about improving wages and living standards for the working
classes.
The accelerated economic growth and the associated expansion of towns and
cities in Western Europe and North America over the 19th century meant that these
areas steadily consolidated their already signiﬁcant position as a dominating core of
the emerging world system, though in practice, the core itself was divided into very
unequally developed regions (in particular, some were focused on agriculture while
others experienced industrial development and accelerated urbanization).
In relation to this core, the rest of the world could be described as a periphery
spread out over Africa, Asia, and Latin America, much of it subject to colonization
and economic dependency in various ways. As a corollary, the organization of
world trade in the 19th century and well into the 20th century adhered to the logic
of an international division of labour in which the periphery produced raw materials
(especially agricultural products and minerals) to supply the factories and feed the
workers of the core countries while a portion of the manufactured products of the
core was exported to the periphery (usually at very unfavorable terms of trade). The
net consequence was greatly enhanced growth in the core and a steadily widening
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gap between the wages and living standards of industrial-urban workers in the core
and the mass of workers in the periphery. In relation to this system, urbanization
under the aegis of colonial capitalism in the periphery was dominated by the
expansion and development of entrepôt (i.e. warehousing and exporting) cities at
coastal sites like Accra, Calcutta (Kolkata), and Lima, which also hosted emergent
production and servicing functions. Urbanization also proceeded at resource
exploitation locations, trading posts, and administrative centres at more inland
locations. Intertwined with the expanding colonial system of urbanization were
networks of earlier indigenous cities and settlements. In these ways the ﬁrst or
imperial globalization was constituted as a system of uneven and hierarchical
relationships between different places across the world.
3.3 The Mass-Production Metropolis and Beyond
By the beginning of the 20th century, industrialization in the core capitalist
countries was moving into a new and dynamic phase marked by the rise of mass
production and its deployment in process industries like steel and chemicals and
assembly industries such as cars and machinery. In the context of the new rounds of
economic growth set in motion by these events, urbanization in the core capitalist
countries expanded at a notably rapid pace. The most dramatic expression of this
turn of events was the emergence of the so-called Manufacturing Belt of North
America, stretching from the Midwest of the United States to New England plus
adjacent parts of Canada (Fig. 3.1). An echo of this development also occurred in
Fig. 3.1 American Manufacturing Belt. Source A. Pred, The concentration of high value-added
manufacturing. Economic Geography, 1965, 41: 108–132
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the guise of a smaller and more fragmented Western European counterpart
extending discontinuously from the Central Valley of Scotland and the Midlands of
England, through northeastern France, much of Belgium and southern Holland to
the Ruhr region of Germany. Both of these macro-regions constituted the economic
engines of North America and Western Europe over the ﬁrst half of the 20th century
and well into the 1960s. As such, they constituted by far the most important centres
of industrial production and working-class life in the more economically developed
parts of the world.
Among the principal metropolitan areas in the North American Manufacturing
Belt were Chicago, Detroit, Cleveland, Toronto, Montreal, Pittsburgh, and Boston.
Representative cities of the equivalent Western European Belt were Birmingham,
Lille, Roubaix, Essen, and Dortmund. The urban areas of these two great industrial
macro-regions came to be marked over much of the 20th century by distinctive
social and occupational structures reflecting the division of labour in metropolitan
manufacturing systems. On the one side, white-collar workers formed an elite group
of managers, professionals, and technical employees who oversaw production and
commercial affairs. On the other side, large cohorts of blue-collar workers made up
the manual labour force in the primary mass-production plants and their associated
input suppliers. The main industrial cities of North America and Western Europe
also attracted signiﬁcant inflows of migrants. Thus, over the middle decades of the
20th century, African-Americans moved northwards from Southern states like
Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi into the American Manufacturing Belt in search
of work; and Eastern and Southern Europeans also migrated in large numbers into
major industrial centres not only in Europe but also in North America.
In the 1950s and after, manufacturing activities also started to grow rapidly in a
number of cities in selected parts of the world periphery (e.g. Brazil, Chile, Nigeria,
India, Malaysia, South Korea, and Indonesia). Much of this growth was based on
local import-substitution policies involving the expansion of industrial capacity
designed to displace mass-produced goods imported from the core countries.
Various cities in Asia, (e.g. Kuala Lumpur and Taipei), Africa, (e.g. Lagos and
Accra) and Latin America, (e.g. São Paulo and Mexico City) that were affected by
this trend also acquired signiﬁcant working class populations whose numbers were
boosted signiﬁcantly by rural-urban migrants. In some of these places, industrial
workers along with mine-workers and other urban dwellers played an important
role in anti-colonial politics.
The mass-production system revolved centrally around the assembly-line in
large dominant plants constituting the functional core of the system. The suppliers
of these plants formed tiers of direct and indirect input producers. The system was
also associated with many different kinds of administrative, commercial and
ﬁnancial functions. Some of these functions were located inside the factories in the
main manufacturing cities themselves, but large numbers were also accommodated
in specialized ofﬁce districts in primate cities like New York, London, Paris, and
Berlin, or in regional centres such as Johannesburg, Hong Kong and Buenos Aires.
In addition, activities like the stock market and merchant banking were concen-
trated in the same cities, as they had been since the time of imperial globalization
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when they played a strong role in the coordination of ﬁnancial and commodity
flows through international networks. These primate cities were accordingly centres
where the more prosperous business and professional classes congregated, and this
state of affairs was in part reflected in the superior cultural infrastructures and
services that these places had to offer. Even so, certain inner-city areas of these
primate centers were typically occupied by small-scale labour-intensive workshops
producing outputs like clothing, furniture, jewellery, printing services, while sig-
niﬁcant tracts of their more suburban fringes were colonized by large factories.
Over the ﬁrst half of the 20th century, despite interludes of ﬁnancial crisis and
war, this industrial-urban system consistently engendered rising wages and high
levels of prosperity in the core countries. In particular, after the Second World War,
the so-called “Long Post-War Boom” lasting until the late 1960s, created unprece-
dented levels of economic well-being for workers in North America and Western
Europe, and helped to underpin the Pax Americana under which the post-War
international political settlement was partly stabilized. These developments coincide
with the period that we earlier described as “American globalization”.
By the 1950s, many parts of the world periphery (now coming to be known as
the “Third World”) were assertively gaining their independence from the former
colonial powers, and were seeking their own pathways to growth and development.
As we have seen, some of the larger Third World countries also attempted at this
time to promote indigenous industrialization programs on the basis of import
substitution. Many cities in these countries experienced waves of in-migration from
surrounding agricultural areas where standards of living were signiﬁcantly lower
and where technical and organizational changes in agriculture were also leading to
population displacement. Hence population growth in these cities was at times far in
excess of actual labour demands giving rise to shanty towns with large numbers of
economically and politically marginalized individuals making a living on the basis
of informal work (i.e. work that is ofﬁcially unrecorded and/or evades regulation
and taxation, or is illegal). The urban areas most affected by this syndrome, (i.e.
mega-cities such as São Paulo, Lagos, Mumbai, and Manila) often came to be
described as being “macrocephalic,” signifying their relatively overgrown dimen-
sions in relation to other cities in the same country, and even by comparison with
large cities in richer countries.
3.4 Crisis and Renewal
3.4.1 Industrial-Urban Restructuring
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Long Post-War Boom in the core capitalist
countries was beginning to show signs of exhaustion. The causes of this change are
too complex for a full treatment here, but one of the important contributory factors
was certainly a rapidly accelerating tendency for manufacturing activity to disperse
away from traditional industrial cities and regions and to seek out alternative
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locations where land and especially labour were relatively cheap. This process took
the form of the relocation of branch plants, ﬁrst of all to the southern states of the
US (the “Sunbelt”) and less developed regions of Europe (like the Italian
Mezzogiorno) and then to various parts of the periphery of the global economy. The
resultant decline of productive activity in the previously dominant industrial cities
of North America and Western Europe provoked deepening ﬁscal crises and rising
unemployment, so much so that by the mid-1970s, the American Manufacturing
Belt itself was coming to be known as the “Rust Belt,” a term that captures the
extensive dereliction, abandonment, and job loss that came to characterize the
region at this time. Detroit, the former world capital of car production, was notably
devastated by decentralization of production capacity and employment. Even today
much of Detroit remains in a state of advanced decay and its current population is
just half of what it was at the beginning of the 1970s (see Fig. 3.2).
Other major urban casualties of this phase of global urbanization were in some
of the poorest countries in the world, which were especially badly affected by the
economic crises in the US and Europe in the 1970s. Encouraged to take on initially
cheap loans (available as a result of an expanding supply of petro-dollars) to cover
the costs of import-substitution policies and declining income from exports of
primary commodities, the burden of these loans increased greatly as interest rates
rose during the crisis. Cities in countries which had seen signiﬁcant modernization,
such as Zambia or Kenya, saw a collapse in investment, infrastructure provision and
Fig. 3.2 Empty Packard plant and surrounding derelict land, Detroit, 2010. Source A.J. Scott and
E. Wyly, Emerging cities of the third wave. City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory,
Policy, Action, 2011, 15: 289–321
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even basic services. City life and work became more precarious and informalized—
at times even accompanied by reversal of migration as well as by remittances of
food and income from the countryside to the city.
From the early 1970s onwards, the outflow of branch plants and investment
capital from the core countries of capitalism to selected sites in the world periphery
continued apace. Favored destinations for this relocation activity were export
processing zones in Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Mexico and
Brazil, and subsequently in emerging Chinese industrial cities, such as Shenzhen
and Shanghai. In tandem with these developments the old international division of
labour involving the flow of raw materials to the core and the reverse movement of
manufactured products to the periphery started to give way to a new dispensation in
which unskilled blue-collar manufacturing jobs were increasingly being relocated to
the cities of the periphery while the more skilled white-collar functions of man-
agement, R&D, and commercialization remained concentrated in the large
metropolitan areas of the core countries. Accordingly, it seemed for a while as
though the long-term economic geography of capitalism was destined to coincide
with the establishment of a durable division of global space into two specialized
zones, one devoted more or less exclusively to white-collar employment and the
other to blue-collar employment. It turned out, however, over the 1980s and 1990s,
that much of the world (and especially the urban world of work) was due to develop
in some surprisingly unforeseen ways.
3.4.2 The New Capitalism and Urban Occupational Change
The foundations of the mass-production system and its satellite production activities
coincided preeminently with capital-intensive electro-mechanical technologies. But
after the late 1970s and early 1980s, a new technological regime based on digitized
methods of calculation, information storage, and communication started to emerge
and began insistently to penetrate into all sectors of the capitalist economy,
including not only manufacturing, but also, business, ﬁnancial, and other service
sectors. As it happens, the 1980s also coincided with the collapse and reorgani-
zation of the old tripartite international order designated in terms of First, Second,
and Third Worlds. This shift was manifest in the rise of corporate globalization as
the concrete expression of a steadily integrating worldwide capitalism reinforced by
a turn to pro-market neoliberalism in the policy sphere.
The new capitalism that started its historical ascent at this time was distin-
guishable not only by a rapidly evolving technological environment, but also by the
displacement of the mass production system as the leading edge of growth and
innovation. Expanding new and revitalized sectors like high-technology and soft-
ware production, business and ﬁnancial activities, personal services (ranging from
medicine to tourism), and a vast array of cultural and creative industries including
ﬁlm, music, architectural design, and media rose to prominence as signiﬁcant foci
of capitalist development. Of special interest here is the fact that these sectors are
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also overwhelmingly located in large metropolitan areas, not only in the traditional
core countries of world capitalism, but now, too, in many big cities in former Third
World countries. Firms in these sectors are strongly susceptible to agglomeration
economies in the sense that as they cluster together so the costs of interﬁrm
interaction and labour recruitment tend to fall while innovation is stimulated by the
co-presence of many different producers and associated interﬁrm flows of infor-
mation. Hence ﬁrms in these sectors frequently locate in close proximity to one
another in the city to form specialized industrial districts, including high-technology
clusters, ofﬁce districts, and quarters devoted to creative and cultural production
(see, for example, Fig. 3.3). These sectors and the work arrangements peculiar to
them now account for some of the most dramatic and far-reaching shifts in patterns
of urbanization today, especially but not exclusively in the more advanced capitalist
countries.
As digital technologies and corresponding organizational readjustments pene-
trate into the more advanced sectors of contemporary capitalism, the economic and
social character of the cities where these transformations are most in evidence is
shifting rapidly. This is apparent not only in new and revitalized clusters of
Fig. 3.3 Locations of motion-picture production companies in Los Angeles. Many different kinds
of industries at different periods of capitalist urbanization evince this same tendency to form
specialized industrial districts in the city. Clustering of individual production units is induced in
large degree by their transactional interrelationships and by their joint dependence on a common
labour market. Source A.J. Scott, A new map of Hollywood: the production and distribution of
American motion pictures, Regional Studies, 36, 2002, 957–975
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economic activity within cities but also in new kinds of labour market structures
and corresponding forms of social stratiﬁcation that are being grafted onto and are
increasingly replacing older social arrangements. In very schematic terms, the upper
occupational tier characteristic of the new capitalism in large cities today can be
identiﬁed in terms of what Richard Florida has called a “creative class” or what
others have referred to as “symbolic analysts.” This upper tier is made up chiefly by
highly qualiﬁed and usually well-remunerated individuals whose work requires
them to exercise well developed cognitive and cultural skills in activities that
include scientiﬁc research, engineering, software development, ﬁnancial analysis,
business consulting, ﬁlm production, artistic pursuits, and so on. The lower occu-
pational tier, by contrast, is composed to a large degree of individuals who carry out
tasks like child care, house cleaning, taxi driving, dish-washing, infrastructure
repair, unskilled ofﬁce work, and a host of similar low-paying activities.
Note the important point that a signiﬁcant proportion of the occupations in the
lower tier of the labor force consist of activities that involve both direct and indirect
services to the upper tier of urban workers. Also, in response to the elevated
flexibility of labour demand arrangements in the new capitalism, the organization of
work in both the upper and lower tiers (but especially in the lower) is frequently
typiﬁed by high levels of part-time and temporary employment. The resultant
precariousness of employment for many low-paid workers in the cities of advanced
countries, and the stark contrasts between skilled, well-paid work, and unskilled
poorly paid work resembles in some respects the more strongly informalized and
unequal labour markets of cities in middle and lower income countries.
An exemplary case of how work in many large cities is changing in response to
these developments can be found in the shifting occupational structure of the Los
Angeles metropolitan area over the last decade or so. Thus, between 2000 and
2012, the number of blue-collar workers in manufacturing in Los Angeles declined
by as much as 31.8 %. Over the same period, the number of workers in high-level
or cognitive-cultural occupations grew by 39.0 % while workers in low-wage
service occupations increased by 18.6 %. A large proportion of the latter workers is
comprised of ethnic and racial minorities and immigrants from low-wage countries.
A further symptom of the changing structure of rewards and penalties in urban life
today is the great expansion in the number of homeless individuals in large cities. It
is estimated, for example, that some 30,000 homeless individuals are now living in
and around the downtown area of Los Angeles.
Urban economies across many cities in Africa and Asia, too, are marked by high
levels of “informality,” involving small-scale production, repair and recycling,
marketing of agricultural goods, and retail trade. In India, for example, estimates
placed informal employment at 83 % of non-agricultural employment in 2000, and
in Kenya at 72 %. Across much of Africa informal employment stands at over
80 % of the working-age population in cities. Some of this informal activity is
caught up in long distance trading networks, as for example in the case of consumer
goods transported from Southeastern China to West Africa. Global corporate
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producers, too, are frequently connected to the informal economy as in the case of
production activities that are linked to poorly regulated factories and sweatshops. In
addition, formal workers in many cities rely on informal supplies of housing and
services.
3.5 Urbanization and Work in the 21st Century
In the 19th and much of the 20th centuries we could speak reasonably meaningfully
about a world system comprising a core and periphery each with distinctive patterns
of economic development and urbanization. Echoes of this core-periphery termi-
nology continue to resonate in what scholars in the 21st century often refer to as the
Global North and the Global South, indicating respectively the wealthier and poorer
areas of the globe, and the often stark inequalities existing across different parts of
the world. As globalization proceeds, however, the mutual interpenetration of the
North and the South becomes increasingly pronounced. Unskilled immigrants from
the Global South converge persistently and in substantial numbers on the cities of
the Global North where they for the most part ﬁnd jobs entailing low-wage menial
activities. Conversely, direct foreign investment in “emerging economies” remains
high despite a slowdown of economic growth in these countries in recent years. At
the same time, while the most advanced sectors of capitalism today are concentrated
in the cities of the North, many are also ﬁrmly implanted in the cities of the South,
which by the same token are also playing an increasingly important role in
exporting high-technology, business service, cultural, and allied products to the
North.
Systematic evidence of this changing economic geography can be found by
scrutinizing Table 3.1, which lists 75 cities identiﬁed by MasterCard as the most
attractive worldwide centres for advanced business and commercial activity in
2008. This particular ranking has its deﬁciencies, but it is probably about as good a
representation of a ﬁrst-cut urban-economic geography of the more prosperous side
of the new capitalism as we are likely to get at the present time. Not surprisingly,
Table 3.1 reveals that the cities of the Global North are clearly dominant, with
London, New York, and Tokyo occupying ﬁrst, second, and third places, respec-
tively. However, a number of cities from the former Third World also rank highly,
notably Singapore, Hong Kong, Seoul, Taipei, and Shanghai, all of them in Asia. In
addition, as we scan further through the rankings a large number of cities from other
parts of the erstwhile Third World also increasingly make an appearance, and cities
like these will undoubtedly improve their rankings in the future.
In spite of the eclipse of the mass production system and the rise of new
conﬁgurations of business and advanced industrial activity, traditional manufac-
turing has by no means disappeared and is still quite evident in many cities around
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Table 3.1 The top 75 Worldwide Centers of Commerce as deﬁned by Mastercard Worldwide
Rank City Country Index
value




79.17 39 Dusseldorf Germany 50.42
2 New York United States 72.77 40 Geneva Switzerland 50.13
3 Tokyo Japan 66.60 41 Melbourne Australia 49.93
4 Singapore Singapore 66.16 42 Bangkok Thailand 48.23
5 Chicago United States 65.24 43 Edinburgh United
Kingdom
47.79




7 Paris France 63.87 45 Tel Aviv Israel 46.50
8 Frankfurt Germany 62.34 46 Lisbon Portugal 46.46
9 Seoul South Korea 61.83 47 Rome Italy 45.99
10 Amsterdam Netherlands 60.06 48 Mumbai India 45.71
11 Madrid Spain 58.34 49 Prague Czech
Republic
45.50
12 Sydney Australia 58.33 50 Kuala
Lumpur
Malaysia 45.28
13 Toronto Canada 58.16 51 Moscow Russia 44.99
14 Copenhagen Denmark 57.99 52 Budapest Hungary 44.52
15 Zurich Switzerland 56.86 53 Santiago Chile 44.49
16 Stockholm Sweden 56.67 54 Mexico City Mexico 43.33
17 Los Angeles United States 55.73 55 Athens Greece 43.25
18 Philadelphia United States 55.55 56 São Paulo Brazil 42.70
19 Osaka Japan 54.94 57 Beijing China 42.52
20 Milan Italy 54.73 58 Johannesburg South
Africa
42.04
21 Boston United States 54.10 59 Warsaw Poland 41.26
22 Taipei Taiwan 53.32 60 Shenzhen China 40.04
23 Berlin Germany 53.22 61 New Delhi India 39.22
24 Shanghai China 52.89 62 Bogotà Colombia 38.27
25 Atlanta United States 52.86 63 Buenos Aires Argentina 37.76
26 Vienna Austria 52.52 64 Istanbul Turkey 36.14
27 Munich Germany 52.52 65 Rio de
Janeiro
Brazil 35.91
28 San Francisco United States 52.39 66 Bangalore India 35.78
29 Miami United States 52.33 67 St. Petersburg Russia 35.55
30 Brussels Belgium 52.16 68 Jakarta Indonesia 35.40
31 Dublin Ireland 51.77 69 Riyadh Saudi
Arabia
35.37
32 Montreal Canada 51.60 70 Cairo Egypt 35.29
33 Hamburg Germany 51.53 71 Manila Philippines 35.15




Rank City Country Index
value
Rank City Country Index
value
35 Dallas United States 51.25 73 Chongqing China 33.13
36 Washington DC United States 51.19 74 Beirut Lebanon 31.81
37 Vancouver Canada 51.10 75 Caracas Venezuela 26.11
38 Barcelona Spain 50.90
Names of cities lying in peripheral and formerly peripheral areas of the world system are set bold
Fig. 3.4 Geographic distribution of shoe manufacturers in Marikina City, Philippines. Each dot
represents one manufacturer. Barangays, or local administrative divisions, within Marikina City
are named, as are adjacent municipalities. The inset shows the location of Marikina City within the
Manila Metropolitan Area. Source A.J. Scott, “The Shoe Industry of Marikina City, Philippines: A
Developing Country Cluster in Crisis”, Kasarinlan: Philippine Journal of Third World Studies, 20,
2005, 76–99
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the world cities, and nowhere more so than in Asian cities where foreign and
domestic owned factories abound. China exempliﬁes this point dramatically.
Additionally, industry in the form of small-scale, labour-intensive production can
be found extensively in poorer countries, as exempliﬁed by the information pro-
vided in Fig. 3.4 and Box 3.1 where the shoe industry of Marikina City in the
Philippines is described. At the same time, marginalized informal and precarious
labor continues to proliferate in large cities in poorer countries (Fig. 3.5). The
recent expansion in manufacturing and other economic activity in more dynamic
Asian and other cities represents an important opening towards growth and pros-
perity, but the poorest cities of the global South, notably in Africa, have struggled to
attract outside investment beyond the primary commodity and minerals extraction
sectors. All the same, many African cities, including Dakar, Accra, Lagos, Kigali,
Nairobi, and, of course, Johannesburg, are increasingly participating in the modern
world economy as entrepreneurial centres in their own right, and local economic
development policies in many parts of the continent are seeking to strengthen the
networks and productivity of the informal economy as well.
Box 3.1. The Shoe Industry of Marikina City, Philippines
Marikina City lies in the far northeast of the Manila Metropolitan Area. For
over a century it has functioned as the principal centre of the Filipino shoe
industry. Like much small-scale enterprise in both rich and poor countries, the
industry is organized into a tight spatial cluster of ﬁrms (see Fig. 3.4) that
often work together in various kinds of subcontract relations and that share a
common labour market. Most of these ﬁrms are quite small and few of them
employ more than ten workers. Wages are notably low in the Marikina shoe
industry, and the main output consists of cheap shoes fabricated in both
leather and synthetic materials for the domestic market. Almost all of the
ﬁrms within the industry are family enterprises owned by individuals with
roots that go deep into the local community. A distinctive intra-family divi-
sion of labor is discernible in many shoe factories, where the wife is fre-
quently engaged in ﬁnancial and commercial tasks and the husband in
shop-floor supervision. Some child labour is also to be found in the industry.
Until the 1980s, the shoe industry in the Philippines was protected by high
tariff barriers, but over the 1990s trade liberalization accelerated greatly. One
effect of this shift has been a notable rise in imports of foreign shoes into the
country with China leading the way as the main source of supply. This state
of affairs has forced many Marikina shoe manufacturers to close down in
recent years. One response to this state of affairs on the part of local manu-
facturers and policy makers has been to attempt to upgrade the quality of
shoes produced so that they can fend off competition from imports and
contest niches in international markets.
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3.6 A Variegated and Uneven Mosaic
One way in which we can begin to make sense of some of the more recent trends
and patterns described in this chapter is to put them in the context of the multi-
dimensional global system of cities outlined in Chap. 1. A world-wide network or
lattice of large cities and extended city-regions has emerged since the end of the
20th century, almost all of them characterized by dynamic economies, with multiple
links and connections to each other as well as to many different small and
medium-sized urban areas, agricultural zones and areas of resource extraction.
The core cities and city-regions that make up this worldwide lattice have pop-
ulations in the multiple millions, and in some cases in the tens of millions (see
Table 2.3), and are found in both the global North and the global South. These
cities are the preeminent sites of the segmented occupational and economic systems
described earlier, though each of them has its own speciﬁc character reflecting its
peculiar forms of economic activity. Accordingly, these cities compete and col-
laborate with one another across the globe in relation to their complementarities and
correspondences. Interspersed within this dominant pattern of global city-regions
are large numbers of small and medium-sized cities with an enormous diversity of
economic characteristics.
Fig. 3.5 Repair and recycling of old cooking oil cans, Mumbai, India. Source National
Geographic, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/ngm/0705/feature3/gallery7.html. Published with
permission of Magnum Photos
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Certainly, modes and levels of economic development differ greatly from one
another across this global-urban system so that the forms of labour, livelihood and
employment characteristic of each individual city also vary widely. Moreover, work
activities not only differ greatly from one city to another but are also highly var-
iegated both functionally and spatially within each individual city. Much of this
variegation is, of course, an expression of the intra-urban division of labour.
Cities, then, are dense clusters of inter-related processes of production, work,
and life. This inter-relatedness is also one of the principal foundations of what,
following the sociologist Emile Durkheim, we might refer to as the organic soli-
darity of urban society, that is, the tightly-wrought interdependencies that hold
cities together as centres of shared social, economic and public life. Equally,
though, urban communities in capitalism are dense sites of private property,
competitive economic relationships and socially selective forms of appropriation so
that urban existence is also subject to intense contestatory pressures. The following
chapter elaborates on these themes of the private and the public in cities in relation
to the challenge of creating and ﬁnding urban shelter.
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